

Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571-1644

Local Comparisons and Global Connections

Birgit Tremml-Werner

Amsterdam University Press

Contents

Acknowledgements	9
------------------	---

Part I The Setting

Introduction	15
The Empirical Setting	15
Noteworthy Scholarship	22
Multilingual Primary Sources	31
Comparisons and Connections	35
A note on names and places	42
1 The Comparative Framework	43
Comparing Political Economies	43
The Spanish Overseas Empire	44
Overseas Colonies and the Spanish Political Economy	50
Repositioning in an Emerging Global World: European	
Conflicts in an Overseas Context	53
Ming China	55
Ming China's Political Economy	60
Repositioning in an Emerging Global World	63
Azuchi-Momoyama/Tokugawa Japan	68
Political Economy – Tokugawa <i>seiken</i>	71
Repositioning between two Worlds	76
Encountering the Other	83
Concluding Remarks	89

Part II Cross-cultural Encounters in the Philippines

2 The Foundations of a Global Stage	93
The Early Modern Philippines	93
The Islands in Pre-colonial Times	94
The Arrival of the Spaniards	98

The Castilian Territorial Model	100
Land Seizure and Regional Administration	100
Colonial Offices	106
Secular and Ecclesiastical Administration	109
Crown Monopolies: Overseas Spain's Political Economy	113
The Pillars of the First European Capital in the East	117
Vicious Demographic Circles	118
Towards Manila's Global Integration	122
3 The Trilogy of Triangular Trade	125
<i>Junk Trade, Trans-Pacific Trade, and Provision Trade</i>	
The Manila System	125
How It All Began	129
South China Sea Trade in the Sixteenth Century	134
A Vast 'Chinese' Network	134
Integrating Manila	137
Integrating the Manila Galleon into South East Asian Trading Networks	142
Indigenous Participation and the Origins of Sino-Japanese Trade in Luzon	142
Fujianese Trade with Manila	144
Irregular Beginnings and Institutionalising Attempts of Hispano-Japanese Exchange	148
Commercial Gifts: Peculiarities of Hispano-Japanese Trade	151
The Spirits That They Called – Bargaining on the Spot	153
Provisions Trade	157
Connections between Manila and Macao	161
Concluding Remarks	167

Part III Zooming Out: Local, Central, and Global Connections

4 Triangular Foreign Relations	171
<i>Intercultural Diplomacy in the South China Sea</i>	
Diplomatic Shifts between Japan and Ming China	173
Foreign Relations between China and Overseas Spain	180
Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the Overseas Empire	192
Irregular Beginnings	192
Diplomatic Relations between Tokugawa Japan and the Spanish Overseas Empire	199

5	Local and Central Dualism	209
	Manila Trade-related Central and Local Dualism	211
	Hispanic Actors and Trans-Pacific Silk Bartering	213
	Japanese Silk Imports and Macro-regional Consequences	218
	Private versus <i>Shuinsen</i> Trade with Luzon	222
	Competition between Beijing and Fujian	230
	Maritime Insecurity and Shifts in the Manila System	234
6	Local-Central Tensions	239
	<i>Geopolitical Strategies, Intelligence, and Information Gathering</i>	
	Geopolitical Shifts	239
	China: Taiwan and the Zheng	239
	Japanese Advances in New Spain	244
	Japan and the Philippines: Alienation and Its Consequences	248
	Early Modern 'Capacity Building': Transfer via Manila	253
	Ming China and Information Gathering	254
	Technological Transfer: Case Studies from Japan	256
	Concluding Remarks: Local-Central Dualism in Foreign Relations	261

Part IV Zooming In: Early Modern Manila and Regional Globalisation

7	Manila as Port City	267
	New Communication Patterns and Early Modern Globalisation	270
	East Asian Human Agency	272
	Intramuros	277
	Parian	278
	Japanese Towns	282
	A Flexible Labour Market?	284
8	Actors and Agency	291
	<i>Everyday Life Constraints: Head Taxes, Revenues, Residence Permits</i>	
	Juridical Issues and Multicultural Conflicts	293
	Overseas Chinese (<i>Huaqiao</i>) in Manila	294
	The Japanese in Manila	300
	Cultural and Social Issues	304
	Maritime Manila's and Post-1624 Developments	311
	Concluding Remarks	313

Conclusion	315
References	319
Primary Sources	319
Unprinted Sources	319
Printed Sources	319
Secondary Sources	321
Index	359

Maps

Map 1	The Manila System	21
Map 2	Ming China	58
Map 3	Azuchi-Momoyama/Tokugawa Japan	72
Map 4	The Philippines under Spanish Rule	102
Map 5	The South China Sea, ca. 1571-1644	121
Map 6	Triangular Trade	141
Map 7	Pacific Routes	216

Tables

Table 1	Indigenous Tribute 1584-1604	106
Table 2	Catholic Friars in the Spanish Philippines	112
Table 3	Revenues and Spending of the Manila Treasury in 1611	114
Table 4	Chinese Trading Ships to Luzon	147
Table 5	Japanese Ships to Luzon	226

Introduction

Gradually commerce has so increased, and so many are the Sangley¹ ships which come to this city laden with goods – as all kinds of linen and silks; ammunition, food supplies, as wheat, flour, sugar; and many kinds of fruit (although I have not seen the fruits common in España) – and the city has been so embellished, that were it not for the fires and the calamities visited upon her by land and by sea, she would be the most prosperous and rich city of your Majesty's domains. As I have written to your Majesty in other letters, this city has the best possible location for both its temporal and spiritual welfare, and for all its interests, that could be desired. For on the east, although quite distant, yet not so far as to hinder a man from coming hither, with favourable voyage, lie Nueva España and Perú to the north about three hundred leagues, are the large islands of Japón; on the northwest lies the great and vast kingdom of China, which is so near this island that, starting early in the morning with reasonable weather, one would sight China on the next day.²

The Empirical Setting

All crucial dimensions of early modern Manila are summarised in the above-mentioned quote: the city's cross-cultural character, her promising commercial potential, and the challenges that would determine the development of the colony. Voiced by the first Bishop of Manila, Domingo de Salazar (1512-1594), in a letter to the Habsburg King Philip II (1527-1598), it illustrates multilayered encounters in Manila at the beginning of the historical processes that serve as the frame for a 'connected histories' analysis. During the first decades of Spanish colonial rule (1565-1898), the far-reaching dimensions of contacts between several political economies led to a pre-modern, 'regional globalisation',³ with positive and negative features.⁴

1 The origins of the pejorative term used by the Spaniards for members of Fujianese merchant communities are still debated among historians. It probably originated from a mispronunciation of *chang lai* (those who come frequently) or *shang lai* (those who come to trade). See Ollé (2002), *Empresa*, pp. 244; 263.

2 Bishop Domingo de Salazar to King Philip II in 1588. Cf. Blair, Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898* (hereafter BR), vol. 7, pp. 221-222.

3 Jan de Vries has used following definition based on Manfred Steger's short summary: 'globalization is about shifting forms of human contact leading toward greater interdependence and integration, such that the time and space aspects of social relations become compressed, resulting in the 'intensification of the world as a whole.' Cf. de Vries (2010), 'Limits of Globalization', p. 711.

4 Vanhaute (2012), *World History*, pp. 9-23.

Soon after the arrival of Ferdinand Magellan (pt. Fernão de Magalhães, sp. Fernando de Magallanes, 1480-1521) in Cebu half a millennium ago, the absence of spices and precious metals disappointed the new arrivals. Even after the formation of a permanent colonial settlement, the Philippines remained of secondary interest to imperial Spain – not many Spaniards lived there, and those who did behaved rather independently.⁵ Yet, although developments in the Philippines did not reflect what the Spanish Crown wanted, the capital of the Spanish Philippines, Manila, happened to be the specific area where the Spanish interacted with the Chinese and the Japanese, as did their political economies.⁶ Hence global economic historians regard 1571 as the starting point for sustained long-distance trade that was for the first time truly global. Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez wrote in an article about the impact of intercontinental silver flows on world affairs that ‘Manila was the crucial entrepôt linking substantial, direct, and continuous trade between the Americas and Asia for the first time in history’.⁷ With the establishment of Manila as a permanent trading base for exchanging American (primarily Mexican)⁸ silver and Chinese silk in the last third of the sixteenth century, the economic zone grew by integrating various regions into the emerging global economy. The point of departure for this book is this Manila-based triangular trade.⁹ However, while economic historians characteristically focused on trade currents and their impact on economic long-term developments,¹⁰ they have failed to see the fascinating nature of Manila trade, being the ambiguous product of diverging political and ideological concepts of three powerful

5 The introductory chapters of John Crossley’s biography of the Spanish soldier and *procurador general* Ríos de los Coronel, outlines several determined and glory-seeking individuals who governed the colony far away from the motherland. See Crossley (2011), *Ríos Coronel*.

6 Mercantilist thought dominated the Spanish political economy of the time. See Bonney (1995), ‘Early Modern Theories’, pp. 171-172.

7 Flynn, Giráldez (1995), ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon”’, p. 201.

8 Alfonso Mola, Martínez-Shaw (2011), ‘Era de la plata española’.

9 In its original meaning the term refers to the Atlantic exchange of European manufactured goods, African slaves, and New World resources as well as agricultural products. Hence it differs strikingly from exchange via Manila. In the Pacific, triangular trade refers to the characteristic trade patterns that linked the China Seas to the American continent and its East and Southeast Asian peripheries.

10 Jan de Vries has early on acknowledged the global relevance of the trading route: ‘The ultimate expression of this speculative basis of international trade was the Manila-Acapulco trade. Because of the inordinate value of silver in Asia and the inordinate demand for silk in Europe, Spaniards found it worthwhile to send silver to Manila and exchange it for silk, which would be sent back to Acapulco, transshipped to Vera Cruz, and then sent on to Spain. Small changes in those conditions undermined this trade in the early seventeenth century.’ Cf. De Vries (1976), *Economy of Europe*, p. 115.

pre-modern states.¹¹ Manila's economic and urban development would have looked entirely different without the direct and indirect contributions from the cultural and economic spheres of China, Japan, and Overseas Spain.¹²

As a 'Eurasian' port city, early modern Manila was undoubtedly the product of a *histoire croisée* at the heyday of what Anthony Reid has termed an 'Age of Commerce'.¹³ In this respect, several historians have tried to evaluate the Manila Galleon trade in American silver and Chinese silk, its effects on the Spanish economy, and the Philippines' delayed economic development, as non-self-sustaining economy and a disintegrated hinterland.¹⁴ Valuable evaluations certainly have to go beyond hasty conclusions about laziness and human greed. Indeed, it has often been argued that the poor economic development of the Philippines was more the result of inefficient Castilian governance and less the product of the multicultural nature of the area. How remote Spain, despite her fragile political power structure in Asia managed to dominate Manila, where annually at least 100,000 kilograms of silver circulated, and where fierce competition from other powerful pre-modern states existed, had not yet been sufficiently confronted.¹⁵ Not only do we have to abandon the popular view that the city was nothing more than a

11 I will here use Charles Tilly's straightforward definition of a state: 'When the accumulation and concentration of coercive means grow together, they produce states; they produce distinct organisations that control the chief concentrated means of coercion within well-defined territories, and exercise priority in some respects over all other organisations operating within those territories.' Tilly (1990), *Coercion*, p. 19. David Kang has also worked with the concepts of 'states' by supporting his reasoning with Max Weber who defined a state as representing 'a social community and territory, with a monopoly of legitimate violence within that territory.' See Kang (2010), *East Asia*, p. 26. For a discussion on how to apply the concepts of early modern state and state building in a transcultural context and terminological challenges, see Flüchter, "Structures on the Move", 1-19. The author (p. 2) defines 'states as phenomena produced by social actions, as spaces of interaction, and as networks of institutions that structure action'.

12 Bhattacharya (2008), 'Making Money', pp. 1-20. For a concise synthesis, see Iaccarino (2008), 'Manila as an International Entrepôt', pp. 71-81.

13 See Gipouloux (2009), *La Méditerranée Asiatique*.

14 Bjork (1998), 'Link', pp. 51-88; Escoto (2007), 'Coinage', p. 213: 'Hispanic colonial Philippines present a classic example of a nation's commerce gone awry right from the beginning. The island colony had a flourishing foreign trade unparalleled elsewhere in Southeast Asia, but its interior commerce was generally stuck in a barter system until the mid-nineteenth century. The underlying cause of this imbalance was the lack of appropriate coinage.' The author blames the Mexican peso's functioning as currency not only for the continuation of the barter system but also for the Chinese monopoly of the domestic market.

15 For an overview on the political entities in South East Asia and the connections between them, at the moment of the Spanish arrival, see Reid (1999), *Charting*.

trading outpost for the Spanish and the Chinese,¹⁶ but also any tentative explanation for these peculiar circumstances has to take two diverging aspects into account. Research that characterises historical aspirations and attitudes about Manila must consider both the role of environmental circumstances that included pre-existing maritime networks on the macro level and rivalry of actors and agencies 'at home' on the micro level.¹⁷

The South China Sea offered particularly favourable conditions for the development of long-distance trade.¹⁸ However, considerable differences in the behaviour of states, the role of cultures represented in language, religion, and traditions, as well as political economies shaped the outcome of proto-global connections.¹⁹ Between 1570 and 1640 trade expanded not only because rulers showed an interest in benefiting directly from foreign commerce, but also through passive connections and interaction. Spain, China, and Japan may be described as having a period of similarities found in 'territorial consolidation, administrative centralisation, cultural/ethnic integration, and commercial intensification', as Lieberman has noted.²⁰ Moreover, at the dawn of this period, recently described as the '1570s system' by Nakajima Gakushō,²¹ of closer connections between Europe and Asia, certain parts of each of the three pre-modern states had achieved a high literary culture and civilisation and had 'attained a high degree of socio-political organization and material culture'.²²

After 1570, the crossroad identity of the maritime macro region, where commercial exchange had stimulated regional networks since the first millennium, created a fluid environment, which in turn encouraged the emergence of what I hereafter will call the 'Manila system'.²³ The term 'system' here stresses reciprocal forces and long-lasting structures that overlap with

16 For the 'way-station thesis', see among others Boxer (1970), 'Plata Es Sangre', pp. 457-478, Knauth (1972), *Confrontación Transpacífica*, and Spate (1979), *Spanish Lake*. For the ideas of the 'California School' on Manila's role in global economic history, see the famous work of Frank (1998), *ReOrient*.

17 Serge Gruzinski has addressed the colonisation of the Philippines within the diversified frame of Iberian colonial mobility. Gruzinski (2004), *Quatre Parties du Monde*, pp. 30-60.

18 Grove, Hamashita, Selden (eds) (2008), *China, East Asia and the Global Economy*.

19 For the role of culture in influencing economic developments, see Vries (2003), *Via Peking Back to Manchester*; Jones (2006), *Cultures Merging*; Sanjay Subrahmanyam specifically synthesised culture's impact on maritime relations, political economies, fiscal regimes, geography, and society in Asia. Subrahmanyam (1990), *Political Economy of Commerce*, pp. 9-45.

20 Lieberman (1999), 'Transcending', p. 7.

21 Nakajima (2013), 'Kōeki to funsō', p. 26.

22 Darwin (2007), *After Tamerlane*, pp. 27; 42.

23 I am aware that the term 'system' is already taken and moreover problematic since the Manila system is not characterised by centre-periphery relations as stipulated by sociologists since the 1960s. My conceptualisation borrows from Braudel's world economy definitions as well as from global history empire theories of John Darwin.

ideas about connected histories. The Manila system was characterised by multilayered connections based on negotiations, a complex market torn between protectionism and free trade, triangular circulations and bi- or multilateral communication involving different parties of the pre-modern states Ming China, Azuchi-Momoyama and later Tokugawa Japan, and the Spanish Overseas Empire.²⁴ Contacts were not confined to Manila: ports such as Quanzhou (泉州) in Fujian/China or Nagasaki (長崎) in Kyushu/Japan, and surrounding oceanic space all the way to Mexico, also became integral parts of the network. Crucial to the understanding presented in this study is the high degree of improvisation in this formative period. The hybrid outcomes of the state-controlled exchange in silver and silk and continuous tensions caused by smuggling and corruption, linked to other systems or networks including the Japanese licensed foreign trade system from 1604-1635 (朱印船, jp. *shuinsen*), the Atlantic system, and the Chinese tributary trade system.²⁵ S.A.M. Adshead already used the term 'Manila system' in 1988 in an attempt to integrate the concepts of empire, government, and statehood.²⁶ My formulation of the concept Manila system serves as a micro model for the macro analysis of the complex entanglements and forms of competition *between* the states mentioned above and between the local and the central *in* those states. A limitation to central and local factors may indeed be too narrow and at times it will be necessary to modify the scope, adding categories such as regional and global. Moreover, this book will present several actors who simultaneously represent local and global interests as characteristic of the Manila system.

The three pre-modern states discussed here considered commercial relations as a form of 'negotiation', a fact that stresses the close links between diplomacy and trade. The strong role of diplomacy is a further important characteristic of the Manila system. Close diplomatic ties were just one

24 In each of these three pre-modern states we find a single hereditary ruler who reigned over a well-defined territory with a largely agrarian economy. Governance was supported by sophisticated bureaucratic structures. See Goldstone (1991), *Revolution and Rebellion*, p. 4.

25 Not far from Manila another system developed a few decades later. Paul van Dyke described it in his seminal work as the Canton system. Van Dyke (2005), *Canton Trade*. The Canton system lasted from 1700 until 1842. It required European traders to have guild merchants act as guarantors for their good behaviour and financial transactions. Describing transactions and interactions with a specific focus on the power of knowledge as well as the use of language as political tool, the meticulous study shows how foreign merchants were treated and which institutions and actors supervised and controlled them. Paul van Dyke concluded that the Chinese state was particularly interested in maintaining harmony and control in foreign trade.

26 Adshead (2001), *China in World History*, pp. 206-208. While Adshead has to be credited for a tentative comparison with Habsburg Spain, his hasty conclusions, such as calling the Manila system China's most important link to the outside world, are problematic.

aspect of East Asian interconnectedness, complicating a clear distinction between profit-oriented commerce and political communication.²⁷ Less acknowledged is the fact that Luzon, the largest island in the Philippines on which Manila is located, was part of the East Asian diplomatic net, to the same extent as the archipelago was part of a larger South East Asian maritime world and the Hispano-American colonial culture zone.

Historical research on the South China Sea has shown that in part because of Ming China's restrictive policies on foreign trade, this region encouraged mainly private traders, who were calling at key Malay entrepôts such as Melaka and Chinese coastal centres prior to the arrival of the Iberians.²⁸ Private traders included people of a range of backgrounds: Muslim, Malay,²⁹ Overseas Chinese mostly from Southern Fujian, Ryukyuan, and merchants from the Indian subcontinent. This liberal environment fuelled the formation of loosely allied Japanese and Chinese trading groups including so called 'Japanese pirates' (倭寇, ch. *wokou*, jp. *wakō*).³⁰ It is noteworthy that the latter's maritime activities peaked around the middle of the sixteenth century, at a time when the Iberians appeared as promising business partners in East Asia.³¹ Together with merchants from Fujian, illicit merchant adventurers would become the pioneers of Manila trade and substantially contribute to the flourishing decades in the development of the Manila Bay.³²

27 Japanese historians put particular emphasis on diplomacy and trade as overarching frame of pre-modern transnational relations in East Asia. Tanaka Takeo and Murai Shōsuke, for instance, have carried out pioneering research since the 1970s in Japanese. See Tanaka (1996), *Zenkindai*; Murai (1999), *Chūsei nihon*; Murai (2013), *Nihon chūsei*. English-language scholarship caught up in recent years. Kang (2010), *East Asia*, p. 108: 'Trade served as a double-edged instrument of system consolidation: it facilitated both more intense state-to-state interactions and the development of domestic state institutions. The picture that emerges is one [...] governed by national laws, diplomacy, and protocols, with states attempting to control, limit, and benefit from trade.'

28 For the mobile networks in the South China Sea I refer to Lockard (2010), 'Sea Common to All', pp. 219-247.


29 Anthony Reid called the term 'Malay' an as 'portentous label' as 'China' in the context of South East Asian history. The term's connotations changed over time. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it commonly served the Europeans as cultural-linguistic marker for people inhabiting the area between Melaka, Brunei, and Java. See Reid (2010), *Imperial Alchemy*, p. 81.

30 *Wokou/wakō* literally means 'Japanese pirate'. But most of the time, these associations comprised a larger number of Chinese merchants.

31 Maehira (2008), 'Minchō', pp. 61-76.

32 Chinese merchants calling on Manila were mainly Min people also known as Hokkien or Minnan 閩南. Integration of the archipelago into macro-regional networks dates back to earlier centuries; yet the attraction of Luzon and Visayas increased enormously once the Europeans had settled there.

Map 1 The Manila System



Manila's economic 'failure' of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contrasts sharply with developments in the early decades. The fact that most studies of pre-modern Manila fail to see local and proto-national influences from China, Japan, and Europe calls for a deeper and more systematic look into the subject.³³ Why Manila trade (the 'generative role of the galleons'³⁴) appeared to encourage only short-term profits invites a closer look at the role of the state in determining foreign relations and at how official decision-making affected economic possibilities. When the three political economies of Spain, China, and Japan first met, central governments did not try to monopolise power in Manila.³⁵ In fact, before the sixteenth century no one nation tried to dominate Asian trade.³⁶

This research covers broad themes such as the nature of governance in early modern Manila, what sovereignty meant to each of these countries, how they applied the concept to Luzon, and to what extent the Manila system influenced maritime policies and geo-political strategies in China, Japan and Spain. My study differs from previous research in the method of analysis used to address the importance of the state for private trading patterns. The chief theme of my narrative describes interactions between local and central actors and agencies that determined most proto-globalisation processes. The multilayered Manila system of mutually influencing levels allows engaging with dynamics and hybrid processes resulting from encounters and interaction. I argue that state-local competition in China, Japan, and the Spanish Overseas Empire more than cultural aspects of these encounters added to Manila's distinct development as Eurasian port city. These encounters' lasting effect on both foreign and domestic policies in all three pre-modern states suggests that low-ranking actors such as merchants possessed significant passive power – both in East Asia and the Iberian Peninsula.

Noteworthy Scholarship

The majority of historical writing has looked at the Philippines in isolation and has repeated long-held misconceptions of their early modern history.

33 One of the most recent examples is Gipouloux (2009), *La Méditerranée Asiatique*.

34 Reed (1978), *Colonial Manila*, pp. 27-30.

35 Legarda (2001), 'Cultural Landmarks', p. 44: 'The resulting trade between the great empire of China and the silver-rich colonies of the Americas, with the Philippines standing in the center of the whole enterprise, gave a completely new dimension, and a new direction, to Asia's trade. It completed the circle of world trade.'

36 Francia (2010), *History*, p. 30.

To conceive an alternative narrative, disentangling the historical processes from national history writing is essential. As indicated above, integrating a focus on Manila into world history means examining 'large processes' embedded in multilayered structures by (a) considering the city's contribution to (proto-)global developments and socio-economic phenomena to understand the empirical level and (b) providing a balanced view of different narratives and discourses to understand the historiographical level. The city of Manila serves as a framework for this study's triangular relations and thus appears as a convenient starting point. Yet this is not a straightforward task because historical research on the early modern Philippines is scattered. At first glance much of the historiography on the Philippines lacks objectivity. Often it reads as a story, history, or historiography of extremes, based on either positively or negatively prejudiced views of developments. The colonial period fared particularly poorly, biased by authors' hidden or obvious agendas.³⁷ Such prejudiced views date back to Catholic chronicles, and continued in imperialist and nationalist writing of the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Eventually, it experienced a revival in the post-colonial search for a new identity after the country's independence in 1946. The rare examples that address triangular relations do so mostly only indirectly.³⁸

The most prominent work highlighting Manila's role as multiethnic port city is *The Manila Galleon* by William Lytle Schurz, first published in 1939.³⁹ His book gives insights into the exciting history of the ships passing between Acapulco and Manila on behalf of the Spanish Monarchy from 1565 to 1815, i.e. shortly before Mexico gained independence from Spain. French economic historian Pierre Chaunu's *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques* deserves special credit for collecting extensive statistical data on trans-Pacific trade in Spanish archives, revealing that more than a third of American silver went to Asia before the early nineteenth century.⁴⁰ Chaunu argued that Spanish Pacific trade largely adapted to the Atlantic system, a thesis that has been often challenged since.⁴¹

37 For strong nationalistic Philippine history writing see José Rizal's annotations of Morga (2008), *Sucesos*; For a later example see Zaide (1949), *Philippines*. A few exceptions exist, i.e. Jocano (1975), *Philippines at the Spanish Contact*. This reader for students gives a fairly comprehensive primary-source based overview of the early Spanish period.

38 One exception here is Felix (ed.) (1966), *Chinese in the Philippines*.

39 Schurz (1985), *Manila Galleon*.

40 Chaunu (1960), *Les Philippines*. His study is based on *almojarifazgo* records.

41 Carmen Yuste López has argued that merchants of Mexico City were the winners of the trans-Pacific-trade in later decades. See Yuste López (2007), *Emporios Transpacíficos*. She has also

Several Filipino historians have carried out internationally recognised research, although of varying quality. Benito Legarda Jr. started a trend in researching the country's complex economic history, in the late 1960s, and Leslie Bauzon and others followed in the 1980s.⁴² Starting in the 1970s, William Henry Scott's publications constructed a pan-regional model of the Philippines' socio-political organisation, providing students of Philippine history with descriptive detail and analytical insights.⁴³ Although attempts to place the Spanish Philippines in a bigger picture have drawn on research in geography, economic history, and social sciences, China and Japan were rather loosely linked to events in Manila in these studies.⁴⁴ Popular history on the beginning of the Philippines' triangular relations is also problematic.⁴⁵ While Mexican historians rarely insert specific topics in large-scale overviews, despite their acknowledged accomplishments in emphasising the Mexican legacy in the Manila Galleon trade, Filipino historians are reluctant to neutrally address the Hispanic past of their country.⁴⁶ A newer generation of scholars are committed to a more nuanced, objective view of the colonial heritage in their search for distinct features of the Philippines within the context of South East Asia.⁴⁷

Within the field of macro-level perspectives in parallel or comparative histories, scholars often uncritically accepted the *leyenda negra* by painting a picture of a Spanish Crown unable to enforce efficient economic policies.⁴⁸

shown that Mexican traders after 1640 enjoyed financial advantage in Manila. Consequently, Mexican traders and intermediaries became the main beneficiaries of the profits created by the Manila Galleon trade in the eighteenth century.

42 Legarda (1999), *After the Galleons*; Bauzon (1981), *Deficit Government*.

43 To name just the most famous of many: Scott (1994), *Barangay*.

44 Reed (1978), *Colonial Manila*; Roth (1977), *Friar Estates*.

45 The controversial question is no longer simply tackled by a few historians but has become a topic of popular interest. See Martínez Montes (2009), 'Spain and China' (accessed 22 November 2013); see also Vilaró (2011), *Sol Naciente*.

46 Filipino historians of the second half of the twentieth century seem to have had difficulties leaving dependency theories behind, due to ideological, racial, nationalist, or indigenist reservations. A Filipino-centric approach is notorious in the work of Teodoro Agoncillo. John Leddy Phelan's research demonstrates that one did not necessarily have to be born Filipino in order to promote such views. See Phelan (1959), *Hispanization*. For tendentious national history discourses, see Schmidt-Nowara (2008), *Conquest of History*, pp. 175-180.

47 The trend only changed recently with scholars revisiting the multicultural heritage of various aspects of the Philippines' cultural history. See Donoso (ed.) (2008), *More Hispanic Than We Admit*; Other works with similar intentions include Almario (ed.) (2003), *Pacto de Sangre*; Abinales, Amoroso (2005), *State and Society*.

48 The so-called black legend refers to anti-Spanish propaganda. Its origins date back to the Revolt of the Netherlands. While the original *leyenda negra* writing only focused on political and religious issues, Spain's failing economic performance has held centre stage in more recent

Anti-Spanish propaganda has survived in the historiography to the present day. Serious scholars, in turn, overstress a Mexican legacy and Philippine dependence in trans-Pacific contributions as expressed in the idea of the Philippines as a colony of a colony.⁴⁹ For most of the time the question of where to place the Philippines, whether geographically in South East Asia or cultural-politically within the Spanish Empire has limited virtually all studies. Most scholarly publications regarded the Philippines as the fringe colony of an overstretched empire and missed possible considerations of contributions to South East Asian history. In this fashion, Latin Americanists have studied the trans-Pacific link. Both Vera Valdés Lakowsky's work on Sino-Mexican relations and the flow of Mexican silver and Fernando Iwasaki Cauti's on the early links between Asia and Peru fall into that category.⁵⁰ Two monographs focus on the link between the Spanish Empire and Japan with a perspective shift to the Philippines, one by the German historian Lothar Knauth (1972), the other by ex-Jesuit Antonio Cabezas (1995). Both are important forerunners to the present study.⁵¹ Yet these too have their flaws when it comes to source criticism and interpretation.

Apart from the aforementioned Filipino and Mexican research, Spanish scholarship has carried out outstanding research in the field. Research by Maria Lourdes Díaz Trechuelo and María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso on socio-economic developments during the Spanish period and Alonso Álvarez's work on the indigenous taxes and financial aspects of the 'Spanish project' in Asia are particularly noteworthy.⁵² Juan Gil's study on Spanish relations with East Asian powers, and Emilio Sola's work on Hispano-Japanese relations, as well as conference proceedings published by Florentino Rodao, have all contributed to a better understanding of the Asian context.⁵³ It is

black-painted histories. The term itself was coined by Julián Juderías in the early twentieth century and refers to the hostile writing about the Spanish Monarchy and its people. The *leyenda negra* accuses the Spanish of ruthlessly spreading Catholicism and political tyranny. For the impact of the *leyenda negra* propaganda in the days of Philip II, see Pérez (2009), *Leyenda Negra*, pp. 53-139. Spanish historiography responded with the *leyenda rosa*, a narrative that aimed at demonstrating positive Spanish contributions to colonial territories.

49 Barron (1992), *Presencia*; Yuste López (2007), *Emporios Transpacíficos*.

50 Lakowsky (1987), *De las Minas al Mar*; Iwasaki Cauti (1992), *Extremo Oriente*.

51 See Knauth (1972), *Confrontación Transpacífica*; Spate (1979), *Spanish Lake*; Israel (1974), 'Mexico', pp. 33-57; Cabezas (1995), *Siglo Ibérico*. The last one is furthermore infamous for its lack of references.

52 Díaz-Trechuelo (2001), *Filipinas*; Pérez-Grueso (2003), *Relaciones entre España y Filipinas*; Álvarez (2009), *Costo del Imperio*.

53 Gil (1991), *Hidalgos y Samurais*; Gil (2011), *Chinos*; Sola (1999), *Historia de un Desencuentro*; Rodao, Solano, Togoers (eds) (1988), *Extremo Oriente Ibérico*.

unfortunate that academic exchange between Spanish and Anglophone researchers is still limited in this way, to the effect that the archipelago is often only relegated to a footnote in English monographs on the Spanish Empire.⁵⁴

As indicated in the preceding overview, primarily Anglophone research tackled the Philippines' connections with emerging world trade.⁵⁵ Yet, although a significant share of the Manila trade entered China, insufficient attention has been paid to Manila's overall role in pre-modern economies of the region. Spanish scholars have approached the topic via classic economic history, adding profound quantitative research to existing scholarship.⁵⁶ Only in recent years a more nuanced view on transnational collaborations have highlighted the archipelago's outstanding role within a more integrative picture, offering refreshing insights.⁵⁷ Long-held criticism that historians of South East Asia consistently failed to integrate comparative approaches into their research has lately fallen silent thanks to a number of contrary attempts.⁵⁸ Recent interest in the highly profitable trans-Pacific exchange of silver and silk has drawn scholars' attention to South East Asia's role in early globalisation processes.⁵⁹ Strictly speaking, most of these works only added to the already biased view of the Spanish Philippines in world history.

54 See among others Boxer (2004), *South China*, pp. xl-xli. See also Kamen (2003), *Empire*; Parker (2001), *The World Is Not Enough*. One chapter is dedicated to the Philippines, called 'The Pearl of the Orient', pp. 197-237.

55 Dennis O. Flynn reprinted seminal scholarship on the history of the Philippines in his Ashgate Valorum series *The Pacific World*, including Laufer (1907), 'Relations of the Chinese', pp. 55-92; Paske-Smith (1914), 'Japanese Trade', pp. 139-164; Pearson (1968), 'Spain and Spanish Trade', pp. 117-138. For Manila's urban history I refer to Doeppers (1972), 'Development', pp. 769-792.

56 Martínez-Shaw, Alfonso Mola (eds) (2008), *Ruta*. The edition provides both a comprehensive synthesis and fascinating illustrations.

57 See Ollé (2002), *Empresa*; Newson (2009), *Conquest and Pestilence*; Crossley (2011), *Ríos Coronel*; Warren (2012), 'Weather', pp. 183-220.

58 Reid (1993), *Southeast Asia*, vol. 2. For a recently published comprehensive description of the area in the early modern period, see Lieberman (2009), *Strange Parallels*, vol. 2; The first volume of the series focuses less explicitly on the South China Sea but provides nevertheless worthwhile insights: Lieberman (2003), *Strange Parallels*, vol. 1. I should also like to draw attention to Roderich Ptak's work. Ptak (1998), *China*.

59 In this respect, the work by Dennis O. Flynn and Antonio Giráldez on trans-Pacific bullion flows and their impact on the pre-modern world economy has been fiercely debated amongst scholars of economic history. Flynn, Giráldez (1995), 'Born with a "Silver Spoon"', p. 201: '[Global trade] emerged when all important populated continents began to exchange products continuously – both with each other and directly and indirectly via other continents – and in values sufficient to generate crucial impacts on all trading partners.'

It goes without saying that scholarship has developed differently within the realm of Chinese and Japanese history. A distinct set of questions and politico-economic issues about interaction with the international world fostered an understanding of the period before 1639 as a rather insignificant intermezzo of heightened exchange across borders. Historians of Tokugawa Japan used to overemphasise the 'closed-country thesis', which influential scholars such as British historian Charles R. Boxer promoted internationally.⁶⁰ Beginning in the 1970s, Japanese historians looking at Japan within the Asian context began to challenge the closed-country view. While Japanese historians suggest replacing the controversial term 'closed country' (鎖国, jp. *sakoku*) with the more correct 'maritime ban' (海禁, jp. *kaikin*), Ronald Toby criticised the contention that scholars had overlooked Tokugawa Japan's relations with Asia by overrating the rupture in Japan's relations with European powers after 1639. Other Tokugawa foreign relations experts including Arano Yasunori (荒野泰典), and Tanaka Takeo (田中健夫) refuted Boxer's thesis on the transformative impact of Japan's encounter with Christianity and the overemphasis of Europeans in foreign relations. In doing so, however, Toby in particular underestimates Europe in the overall picture and exaggerates early modern Japan's position within the East Asian international system.⁶¹ In addition, more and more research has stressed the maritime dimension of late medieval and early modern Japanese history and thus encouraged studies on coastal interaction and foreign trade.⁶²

Nagazumi Yōko's (永積洋子) survey of foreign traders in Japanese ports such as Hirado (平戸) and official Tokugawa trade in South East Asia has left a significant imprint on the scholarship of the past decades. Outside Japan, Leonard Blussé's 'large and broad' agenda paved the way for numerous works on the interface between diplomacy and trade in the entire China

60 Boxer (1951), *Christian Century in Japan*, p. 362.

61 Toby (1984), *State and Diplomacy*.

62 Catch phrases used by publishing houses such as '*umi kara mita*' (Views from the sea) or '*Ajia no naka no nihon*' (Japan within Asia) point at approaches to Japanese history as inseparable part of the East Asian macro region. Amino Yoshihiko advocated for a multiplicity of centres of medieval Japan as well as looking at Japanese history 'from the sea'; Bruce Batten strongly focused on centre-periphery concepts when arguing against Japanese heterogeneity. Batten (2003), *To the Ends of Japan*. Murai Shōsuke opted for wider time frames in understanding Japanese history. Murai (1997), *Umi kara mita sengoku nihon*. For a synthesis of '*umi kara mita ajia*' (Japan as seen from the ocean)-research, see Ching (2009), 'Japan in Asia', p. 407. He speaks of Japan's 'historical position vis-à-vis Asia' and based on Edward Said, about a 'imaginative geography' that determines Japan's place in a world economy. Nakajima (2007), '16 seikimatsu', pp. 55-92.

Seas in relation to the Dutch East India Company.⁶³ Gradually a group of scholars with a clear focus to overcome Japan-centrism in the study of foreign relations (対外関係史, jp. *taigaikankeishi*) and integrating Japan into world history emerged.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Japanese research is only gradually beginning to play a role in new scholarship in other regions of the world because of language differences.

Notwithstanding influential national history circles, an essential awareness for foreign relations in Japan dates back to the early 1900s and is reflected in a very long tradition of scholarship on early modern Japanese-Filipino relations. Since the early decades of the twentieth century, an impressive number of books and edited source translations by Murakami Naojirō (村上直次郎), Nara Shizuma (奈良静間), and Iwao Seiichi (岩生成一) have provided edited translations of European chronicles and pre-modern Japanese primary source material to students and interested readers.⁶⁵ More recently, academic research by Hirayama Atsuko (平山敦子) and Sugaya Nariko (菅谷成子) have added to the body of available knowledge.⁶⁶ Others have studied European presence (spearheaded by Jesuits and Portuguese merchants) and the impact of Catholicism on Japan.⁶⁷ What all these studies have in common is an astonishing exactness and outstanding familiarity with the multilingual source material, but they often also clearly lack a solid theoretical framework, the courage to link empirical findings with big questions, or a willingness to share research results with scholars outside their discipline. Benefitting from such thorough source-based education and encouraged by gradually increasing exchange with the international academic community and participation in trans-national research projects, a younger generation of scholars has placed Japanese interaction with the

63 Colleagues and students alike honoured Leonard Blussé's innovative scholarship including monographs and contributions to numerous source editions in Nagazumi (2010), *Large and Broad*; For his Japan-related research, see Vermeulen, Van der Velde, Viallé, Blussé (eds), *Deshima Dagregisters* (13 vols); Fernández-Armesto, Blussé (eds) (2003), *Shifting Communities*; Blussé (1996), 'No Boats to China', pp. 51-76; Blussé (1986), *Strange Company*.

64 See among others Ōishi (ed.) (1986), *Shuinsen*.

65 The majority of these play a crucial role in Japan's historical studies up to the present day. Many were published in edited series by the Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo University (史料編纂所 *Shiryō hansenjo*). The most relevant works in the context of the Manila system include translations of Antonio de Morga, Pablo Pastells, Rodrigo Vivero y Velasco, and Sebastian Vizcaíno as well as the *Nihon kankei kaigai shiryō* series including volumes of Jesuit records as *Iezusukai nihon nenpō* and the diaries of the Dutch and the English trading factories in Japan.

66 Murakami (1929), *Don Rodorigo*; Iwao (1937), *Nanyō*; Nara (1942), *Supein komonjo*; Hirayama (2012), *Supein teikoku*.

67 Takase (2002), *Kirishitan jidai*; Gonoï (2003), *Daikōkai jidai*; Gonoï (2002), *Nihon kirishitanshi*.

outside world into a larger context. Their works have furthermore successfully bridged the artificial gap between foreign relations as almost exclusive domain of Japanese history (日本史, jp. *nihonshi*) and Western history's (西洋史, jp. *seiyōshi*) monopoly on studies about the 'Southern Barbarians' (南蛮, jp. *namban*).⁶⁸ Of particular value to the present study are Nakajima Gakushō (中島楽章), Shimizu Yūko (清水有子), and Igawa Kenji's (伊川健二) research on communication between intruding Europeans and the old regimes in East Asia; in addition, Shimada Ryuta's (島田竜登) survey on Japanese-VOC (Dutch East India Company) trade in Asia, Oka Mihoko's (岡美穂子) study of the networks of Portuguese Nagasaki-Macao merchants, Adam Clulow's research on the Dutch East India Company in Japan and surrounding waters, Peter Shapinsky's investigations of *wakō* networks, and Ubaldo Iaccarino's work on Japanese-Spanish relations in the early Tokugawa period proved to be extremely stimulating.⁶⁹ Shimizu Yūko's study on the impact of relations with the Spaniards in Luzon until 1625, the year of the final rupture and end of trade relations, addresses the question to what extent European military and missionary aggression spurned Japan's transition from 'medieval' to 'early modern'. The book furthermore provides a crucial analysis of trade patterns, which explain the complex relation between Luzon and Japan against the background of political modernisation.

Historical treatises on China's role in the emerging trade relations are a slightly different, but no less complex story. Chinese historiography is still underrepresented in comparative studies of global connections. Manila-based studies are no exception, even though Zhang Weihua (張維華) has already carried out significant research in the first half of the twentieth century.⁷⁰ While I certainly intend to once and for all leave Fairbank's out-dated narrative of 'Western impact and Asian responses' behind, I am also conscious of potential new misinterpretations.⁷¹ According to Takeshi Hamashita, who transferred Wallerstein's world system theories to East Asia, the rest of the world had to adapt to China.⁷² As a pioneer in

68 For the rather strict trichotomy (Japanese history, Oriental history, and Occidental history) of historical studies in Japan, see Haneda (2011), *Atarashii sekaishi*, pp. 14-30.

69 In alphabetical order: Clulow (2014), *Company*; Csaba (2009), *Räuberische Chinesen*; Igawa (2007), *Daikōkai jidai*; Iaccarino (2008), 'Manila as an International Entrepôt'; Nakajima (ed.) (2014), *Nanban*; Oka (2010), *Shōnin to senkyōshi*; Shapinsky (2006), 'Polyvocal Portolans'; Shimada (2005), *Intra-Asian Trade*; Shimizu (2012), *Kinsei nihon*.

70 Zhang (1934), *Ming shi folangji*.

71 Fairbank (ed.) (1968), *The Chinese World Order*.

72 Arrighi, Hamashita, Selden (eds) (2003), *Resurgence*.

advocating Asia's global integration, he overturned Marxist narratives and anti-maritime discourses that had long determined the picture of a stagnant Asia and emphasised that China was integrated in the early modern world economy, instead of having a closed economy. Despite widespread consensus on Ming China's function as major economic drive in the macro region, the positions of historians diverge when it comes to the question of the economic spirit and the actual role of Confucian ideology in socio-economic transformation processes in the late Ming. Over the past years similar forms of outspoken Sino-centrism have been challenged. While many non-Chinese scholars have abandoned lengthy debates on oriental despotism, Chinese history finds itself still torn between older stagnation discourses, the desire to stress the values of Sino-centricism, and a new focus on the integrating dynamics of traditional tributary systems.⁷³

Classical Chinese history tended to relegate maritime and coastal topics to obscurity. In contrast, recent historians have established a more nuanced view on China's economic integration by focusing separately on regional and maritime developments.⁷⁴ John E. Wills's wide-ranging survey of the Chinese maritime trade and contacts with the Europeans, including a focus on late Ming/early Qing diplomatic contacts with the West, or Leonard Blussé's efforts to understand the dynamics in the macro region between Xiamen, Batavia, and Nagasaki (social aspects of merchants communities, diplomacy of VOC personnel), have changed our understanding over the past decades. As far as the Manila system is concerned, work by Ray Huang, Lin Renchuan, Angela Schottenhammer, and Manuel Ollé offer particularly relevant insights.⁷⁵ The present study moreover owes a lot to studies on the margins and periphery of the Ming Empire, including research by Timothy Brook and Cheng Wei-chung and new scholarship on Taiwan by Tonio Andrade and José Eugenio Borao.⁷⁶

73 Cohen (1984), *Discovering History*, pp. 1-56; 149-198; For twentieth-century scholarship on pre-modern China, see Zurndorfer (1988), 'Guide', pp. 148-201; A recent Cambridge University Press manual synthesises works on hydraulic despotism, feudalism, anti-imperialism, Chinese nationalist, and traditionalist narratives, as well as recent Western scholarship influenced by postmodernism: Wilkinson (2012), *Chinese History*.

74 For studies on China and Japan's role in an emerging global world around 1600, see Von Glahn (1996), *Fountain*; An economic focus also dominates in Kishimoto (2012), *Chiiki*.

75 Huang (1988), 'Lung-Ch'ing', pp. 511-581; Lin (1990), *Fukien's Private Trade*; Ollé (2002), *Empresa*; Schottenhammer (2007), *East Asian Maritime World*.

76 Andrade (2006), *How Taiwan Became Chinese*; Borao et al. (2002), *Spaniards in Taiwan*, 2 vols; Borao (2009), *Spanish Experience in Taiwan*; Brook (2008), *Vermeer's Head*; Brook (2010), *Troubled Empire*; Cheng (2013), *War, Trade and Piracy*.

Multilingual Primary Sources

This study uses data drawn from correspondence between the Spanish Crown and the colonial government in the Philippines, seventeenth-century records of Japanese foreign affairs, and official records of the Ming dynasty. The inequality in quantity of Western and Eastern sources should not be interpreted as a sign of Euro-centrism, but lies rather in the fragmentary nature of relevant sources. Spain collected far more records on Philippine-related topics than the other countries. Even though China's and Japan's bureaucratic traditions also contributed to an enormous output of historical data, efforts usually excluded records on maritime ventures and the outside world.⁷⁷ Furthermore, Chinese and Japanese interactions and transactions were more often carried out on an unofficial or semi-legal basis. The predominance of private merchants in all trade actions aggravates the dilemma of scholarship in that field. Very often they have left only the faintest trace in documentary records.

The Archivo General de Indias (AGI) in Seville hosts the bulk of official decrees on governing the Philippines, commercial policies, correspondence between authorities and other individuals based in 'Asia Oriental', and memorials and orders of the King and his councils.⁷⁸ Other valuable sources can be found in the Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), and the collections of the Real Academia de Historia (RAH), as well as in Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (ARSI). Chinese and Japanese official records on foreign relation are largely confined to defence policies.

Despite their scarcity, Japanese primary sources on foreign relations of this period represent the second important pillar of this research, predominantly early Tokugawa information gathering about the foreign world, including about the newly arrived Europeans. Most prominent among early modern foreign relations texts are the *Ikoku nikki* (異国日記, *Diary of Foreign Countries*) and the *Tsūkō ichiran* (通航一覽, *Records on Navigation*).⁷⁹ The

77 These developments were part of the seclusion policies and maritime restrictions implemented by the central government both in Ming China and Tokugawa Japan.

78 Clerks (*escribanos*) in all parts of the overstretched Overseas Empire were busily record-keeping in order to keep superiors and supporters in the motherland up-to-date. The voluminous document corpus of the Audiencia de Filipinas of the Archivo General de Indias holds the bulk of relevant Spanish material for this study. Other related sources can be found among documents of the Audiencia de México and the Patronato Real.

79 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), *Tsūkō ichiran*. A compilation of foreign relations documents, issued between 1588 and 1825. For the first printed edition (1911) of the *Ikoku nikki*, see Murakami (ed.)

Gaiban tsūsho (外蕃通所, a collection of Tokugawa diplomatic documents), and a collection with the Bakufu's official daily records (大日本史料, jp. *Dainihon shiryō*) also provide details on relations with Luzon.⁸⁰ A further remarkable document is the *Ruson oboegaki* (呂宋覚書), which was drafted in the 1670s, 40 years after relations with the Spaniards had come to a standstill.⁸¹ When using these materials, one must keep in mind that the majority of these sources were originally collected and compiled by order and under the supervision of the regime.⁸² Historically speaking, record-keeping was monopolised by Zen Buddhist monks, in particular in the realm of foreign affairs, because they controlled correspondence with Japan's Asian neighbours. For the period of this study a very small group of individuals were involved in drafting authorised documents, including licences for foreign trade. Most famous among them are Toyotomi Hideyoshi's diplomatic advisor Saishō Jōtai (西笑承兌, 1548-1608) and Ieyasu's diplomatic staff Sanyō Genkitsu (三要元佶, 1548-1612) from the Enkōji (円光寺) temple⁸³ and the Zen Rinzai monk Ishin Sūden (以心崇伝, 1569-1633), a disciple of Genkitsu.⁸⁴ The language used in all official documents is classical Japanese. During the seventeenth-century Chinese-style Japanese texts (漢文, jp. *kanbun*) remained the language of law, and the syllabaries (仮名, jp. *kana*) are increasingly used for administration records and occasionally in sources drafted outside Japan.

As for Chinese data, works of interest on foreign and tributary trade include printed editions of imperial histories such as the *Ming shi* (明史, *Ming Annals*) and the *Ming shi-lu* (明實錄, *Veritable Records*). Whereas the *Ming shi* with its 332 volumes that were written in the first century of the

(2005) *Ikoku nikki shō*.

80 Nagasaki magistrate Kondō Seisai (1771-1829) collected material for the *Gaiban tsūsho* (1818). See Kondō (1901), *Shinka*, vol. 17.

81 Kawabuchi (1671), *Ruson oboegaki*.

82 It is worth mentioning that hardly any records were drafted in *sōsho* 草書 (cursive script), meaning a calligraphy of abbreviated Chinese characters, still largely legible. Increased bureaucratisation inspired a faster way of writing and led to a spread in *kyōsho* 狂書 (or 行書 *gyōsho*).

83 Also known by his monk title Genkistu Kanshitsu 元佶閑室 and referred to as Gakkō-sama (学校様) by contemporaries, he followed Saishō as drafter of *shuinjō* 朱印状 and in later years contributed largely to the Fushimi press. *Ikoku tokai goshuinchō*: Register of documents related to the overseas trade licences (*shuinjō*). See also *Ikoku kinnen goshosōan* 'Draft of foreign commerce' that included 21 licences to Luzon and Bisaya between 1604-1611.

84 Also known as Konchiin Sūden 金地院崇伝, after having built Konchiin temples in both Edo and Sunpu, Isshin Sūden commuted between these two shogunal residences. Sūden played an important role in negotiations with the Chinese Ming court over the reopening of trade. He was also instrumental in organising foreign delegations and drafting correspondence (国書 jp. *kokusho*). He compiled all the diplomatic records of the *Ikoku nikki*.

Qing dynasty (1644-1911) is part of the official 24 histories of China, the latter contains the imperial annals of the Ming emperors. After the death of each emperor, a governmental office of historical affairs would create a section about his reign using various historical sources, including, for example, the 'daily records'.⁸⁵ Both the *Ming shi* and the *Ming shi-lu* are designed to preserve historical knowledge under the control of the dynasty. Therefore it is only natural that records on foreign trade, in a period of rigid government control and restriction, are rare.⁸⁶ The most valuable primary record on maritime affairs during the Ming is the *Dongxi yangkao* (東西洋考, *Thoughts about the Eastern and Western Oceans*) – first published in 1617.⁸⁷ A study of 12 scrolls by a pre-modern scholar named Zhang Xie (1576-1640) describes the economic situation of overseas countries. One of the strengths of his study lies in its account of the collection of tax revenues from maritime trade. It comprises studies on the Eastern and Western Oceans and is dedicated to the descriptions of the regions of East Asia and their relations with China, and maritime routes.⁸⁸ Furthermore, certain sections of provincial chronicles and annals from Fujian and Guangdong provide additional details on social and economic matters that help to elaborate on a bigger picture of foreign policies and maritime trade.⁸⁹ Unlike Spanish, Portuguese or Italian manuscripts, a significant amount of Chinese and Japanese material has been edited and reprinted for reasons of legibility and archival maintenance.

The Spanish chronicles must also be tested for their reliability, accessibility, and relevance. Early on, members of Catholic orders published documentary records either on what they saw or considered worthwhile

85 Thanks to the painstaking efforts of Geoff Wade, *Ming shi-lu* entries referring to South East Asia have been translated into English. For further information, see Wade, MSL, <http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/> (hereafter Wade, MSL and URL). In this respect an open database on a large number of *Ming shi-lu* records is an extremely useful tool for non-Chinese speakers and provides extensive information on Ming China's foreign policy.

86 Genealogies were essential tokens of gentry prestige in imperial China. A survey of sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries Fujian genealogies could add significant findings to our story. See Zhuang, Zheng (1998), *Quanzhou pu*. Coastal China has had a long tradition of migration to South East Asia. For an analysis of intercultural relations in Manila Fujian genealogies are therefore very valuable as a particular form of historiographical records that was often kept secret to the outside world.

87 Another related source is the *Daming huidian*, a compilation of the Ming dynasty published in 1510 on the tributary system and foreign trade. Chang (1983), 'Chinese Maritime Trade', p. 9.

88 Zhang (1981), *Dongxi yangkao* (hereafter: *Dongxi yangkao*). Large parts of the collection are based on records of the *Ming shi*.

89 Chen (1964), *Fujian tongzhi*; Ruan Yuan, Li Mo (eds) (1981), *Guangdong tongzhi*.

to disseminate.⁹⁰ Their works on the Philippines are closely linked to other potential missionary fields and projects. Thus, accounts of 'Asia Oriental' include extensive descriptions of countries and peoples of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although these are of undisputed interest for our purpose, the famous example of Juan González de Mendoza's *Historia de China*, challenges their reliability.⁹¹ Some of them are still scattered over the globe in the original print and others have been re-edited over the years and can be found in almost any academic library. Antonio de Morga's *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* also deserves special mention as a chronicle by a high-ranking government official in Manila, first published in 1609 in Mexico. De Morga is one of the first non-clerical Spanish writers of Philippine history.⁹² Doctor de Morga, as he is conventionally referred to in sources of his time, was a very controversial, yet well-informed, colonial figure who served as a judge in Manila from 1595 to 1602. His book, which has been widely used by critics and admirers alike, provides a detailed description of political issues, the native inhabitants, Japanese and Chinese settlers and foreign politics. Morga's contemporary, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, also left detailed accounts,⁹³ and Miguel de Loarca, a soldier, also contributed to the corpus of early civilian Spanish accounts.⁹⁴

No study on the Spanish Philippines will be complete without mentioning Emma Helen Blair and James A. Robertson's 55 volumes of translated Spanish

90 Friars in all parts of the Philippines collected information and drafted chronicles from an ethnographic perspective. In chronological order of the first publication date they include Pigafetta (1534), *Primo Viaggio Intorno al Globo Terracqueo*; Chirino (1604), *Relación de las Islas Filipinas*; Pedro Chirino had worked in the hinterland of Manila until 1596 and was then transferred to Cebu, where he became the first Jesuit to administer to a community of Chinese settlers; Aduarte (1640), *Historia de la Provincia del Santo Rosario*; Colín (1663), *Labor Evangélica* (edited and re-published by Pablo Pastells in the early 1900s); de Santa Cruz (1693), *Historia de la Provincia del Santo Rosario II*.

91 Mendoza (2008), *Historia del Gran Reino de la China*. Originally published as *Historia de las Cosas más Notables, Ritos y Costumbres del Gran Reyno de la China* in 1586. An Italian (*Dell'Historia de la China*) and an English translation followed in 1588. Even though it is based on eyewitness reports of Martín Rada and others, the author himself never set foot on Chinese soil. Unlike his namesake, Juan Mendoza Mate de Luna personally visited China. His global life as a New World merchant from Seville, who travelled from Peru to China, Manila, Macao and eventually Mexico, appears in various colonial records. See Iwasaki Cauti (1992), *Extremo Oriente*, pp. 65-105.

92 For the rise and fall of Antonio de Morga as a high-ranking Crown official in the Philippines and the American viceroalties, see Elliott (2009), *Spain and the Wider World*, pp. 16-17.

93 Crossley (2011), *Ríos Coronel*.

94 Miguel de Loarca participated in the first mission from the Spanish Philippines to China in 1574-1575. Loarca (1582), *Relación de las Yslas Filipinas*, see BR V, pp. 134-187.

and Filipino archival material.⁹⁵ One of the problems of this *magnus opus* is that it was compiled at the heyday of American imperialism. Although its very selective contents reflect the anti-Spanish bias of the years after the Spanish-American War of 1898, the compilation is of unprecedented value.⁹⁶

Comparisons and Connections

Instead of using historical evidence to produce superficial, 'flat' generalisations of the early modern world, this book is an attempt to write global history as a combination of traditional history and broader considerations of recent research in global history.⁹⁷ While trying to avoid lofty, unfounded theories, I also want to prove that primary source data is not reserved for micro history.⁹⁸ In combination they help to evaluate the transforming and interconnected world of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁹⁹ Methodologically, this means reading sources 'against the grain'.¹⁰⁰ The method is from anthropology and describes the process of reading a text beyond its author's intention. It encourages the reader to look for hidden views, the 'unexpected', what an author left unsaid, and ultimately to think of reasons for omitted information.¹⁰¹ In our specific case, it requires a very high degree

95 Blair, Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*.

96 Prior to Emma Blair and James Robertson, the Spanish civil servant and ambiguous scholar of the Philippines Wenceslao E. Retana had busied himself in making important documents of the Spanish colonial government accessible to the public. Retana (ed.) (1895-1905), *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino*, 5 vols. For a critical assessment of Retana's work, see Cano (2008), *Retana Revisited*; also Pastells, Torres y Lanzas (1925), *Catálogo de los Documentos Relativos a las Islas Filipinas*, 9 vols; Martínez de Zúñiga (1893), *Estadismo de las Islas*.

97 For criticism of being superficial and counter-arguments see Fernández-Armesto (2009), 'I would be flattered', pp. 170-183. For specific methods and theories of global history that have been subject to major scholarly debate, see Engel, Middell, 'Bruchzonen der Globalisierung', pp. 5-38; Mazlish (1998), 'Comparing Global History to World History', pp. 385-395; Armitage (2004), 'Is There a Pre-History of Globalization?', pp. 165-175; Manning (2003), *Navigating World History*; Bright, Geyer (1995), 'World History in a Global Age', pp. 1034-1060.

98 One example of recent attempts to combine both lines of research is Andrade (2011), 'A Chinese Farmer', pp. 573-591.

99 Haneda (2009), 'Introduction', p. 1; Haneda, Kojima (eds) (2013), *Umi kara mita*, pp. 3-37.

100 The term was coined by David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. See Bartholomae, Petrosky (1993), *Ways of Reading*.

101 Carole A. Myscofski has summarised it as 'a subversive approach to the official historical documents that one encounters from the early modern period. It entails using the documents contrary to the way they were designed and intended, to draw out materials, insights and understandings that the recorders never intended to preserve.' See http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=teaching_excellence (accessed 9 March 2013).

of linguistic sensitivity. Generating data from multilingual sources poses a major risk to data interpretation. In addition to phonetic challenges, there are also specific political rhetoric and semantic problems due to concepts existing in one of the respective languages and not in another. This lexical shift from one language to the next leads to the historical development of asymmetrical perspectives.

Thanks to comparative studies, scholars are able to understand structural similarities and differences and to distinguish between the particular and the general. Manila offers a stage to analyse to what extent similar conditions for foreign trade in China, Japan, and Europe existed up until the end of the eighteenth century.¹⁰² The early figure of global economic history Mark Elvin wrote a famous study on technological decline in the traditional Chinese textile industry that became the base argument for his path-breaking, high-level equilibrium trap theory on the non-occurrence of the industrial revolution in China in 1973. Talking about precisely this issue of cross-cultural difference, he states that '[a]t this point our analysis becomes more complicated, essentially because we are shifting from explaining what did happen to trying to explain what did not.'¹⁰³ Accordingly, I will also start by drawing a general picture in order to find out which institutions, ideologies, and structures were missing, both in Manila and in the political economies of the three pre-modern states.¹⁰⁴ My study builds on a combination of external and internal explanations and on a comparative analysis that emphasises differences and 'parallels', to use Victor Lieberman's term.¹⁰⁵ This book seeks to understand Manila-related

Michel Foucault ('subjugated knowledges') and Carlo Ginzburg also promoted similar methods. My own research benefits from their once revolutionary approaches.

102 This question is prominent in scholarly debates on 'the great divergence'. Pomeranz (2000), *Great Divergence*, pp. 16-24; 225-263. There is a wider debate on China's global economic integration, trade, and capital, dating back to Max Weber and Karl Marx. Leading figures of the last decades include G. William Skinner in the 1960s, and Mark Elvin, Philip Huang, Peter Perdue, and R. Bin Wong from the 1970s until the present day. Most of these authors studied the rural sector; Felipe Fernández-Armesto regularly compares developments in China, Japan and Europe (Spain in particular) and classifies them together: Fernández-Armesto (2001), *Civilizations*, pp. 402, 473.

103 Elvin (1996), 'High Equilibrium Trap', p. 33.

104 See e.g. Rueschemeyer, Mahoney (2005), 'Comparative Social Analysis', pp. 3-40; Marc Bloch has already promoted the comparative method for its usefulness to elaborate on contrasts and filter unifying principles from a multiplicity of circumstances. Bloch (1989), *Feudal Society*, vol. 1.

105 Lieberman (2003, 2009), *Strange Parallels*, 2 vols. His seminal work is a study of the rise and the fall of state power in six different geographical regions, in which the author applied a comparative approach to discover historical connections across separate settings.

cultural and economic developments as connected histories,¹⁰⁶ while being sceptical about generalising interpretations. It is an attempt to challenge one-sided explanations of geographical contingencies or overemphases on institutional explanations for the early modern world.¹⁰⁷

A 'connected histories' approach provides the framework for the analysis of historical processes.¹⁰⁸ In the case of early modern Manila, the development of the first global market was a global process that was sustainable in a way that would have been impossible without interregional cooperation. Manifold contributions from different parties in China, Japan, and Spain created the characteristics of the Manila trade. Regular access to the Manila market led to far-reaching interregional encounters that consequently triggered economic, cultural, and political changes in all three pre-modern states. In response to the 1980s post-colonial critique, the 'connected histories' approach pays attention to a variety of subjects involved in the historical process. Emphasising coexistence, parallels, and interconnections helps highlight the reciprocal process of interaction between the global and the local, or, the universal and the particular. In contrast to 'exceptionalist' interpretations of the historical paths taken by Europeans, Chinese, or Japanese, the all-encompassing framework of this book is influenced by Max Weber's attempt to illustrate the historical development of social processes on a macro level in connection with local peculiarities.¹⁰⁹ When Patrick O'Brien pleads that histories must no longer be written 'within the parameters set by geopolitical competition for economic hegemony, backed by armed forces, among a succession of European states and cities,

106 Eric Vanhaute has suggested two different paths for carrying out research in global history: make global comparisons or look at global connections. Vanhaute (2009), 'Who Is Afraid of Global History?', p. 31: 'Human societies are interconnected on a systematic level, there exist large-scale units of analysis that condition historical developments'. De Vries (2008), *Industrious Revolution*, p. 4.

107 Regarding economic trends around 1600 I agree with Derek Massarella, who has argued that both Europe's and East Asia's contributions to long-distance trade have been misinterpreted. Massarella, 'What Was Happening?', <http://www.casahistoria.com/happeningin1600.pdf> (accessed 13 October 2013).

108 The methodological framework of 'connected histories' goes back to Sanjay Subrahmanyam's manifesto for the study of connected history that became one of the leading directions in the study of global history. In that article he advocated focusing on the connectedness of different entities and areas aiming to get a broader view on early modern history. See Subrahmanyam (1997), 'Connected Histories', pp. 735-762.

109 Despite his efforts to explain phenomena that were in his view uniquely European, such as capitalism or bureaucracy, Max Weber remained sceptical about large-scale generalisations in his systematic comparison of economic, political, and religious phenomena in different world civilisations. Turner (1993), *Max Weber*, pp. 26, 32.

experiencing their own particular circles of rise, decline and revival', he does so with good reason.¹¹⁰ The only way to overcome the barriers constructed with national history narratives and a strong focus on European competition as an 'engine' for change is by shifting one's perspective to port cities as fluid centres of commerce that enabled exchange of all kinds of ideas. Both connected and comparative histories show that demographic and economic forces are undeniably linked with culture and are thus suitable approaches for an examination of Manila, where both Catholic and neo-Confucian morals were affected in everyday lives.¹¹¹

For quite some time port cities were primarily studied within the framework of urban history; in recent years, however, port cities have often been perceived as *deus ex machina* explanations for innovative developments or exceptional developments. Often being created by outside agency, they functioned as connectors, hubs, and motors of change within their own framework. Rather than being integrated into a country or region, port cities were often closer connected to each other by the merchants sojourning freely between them, than to a metropolis.¹¹² Despite the popularity of the buzzword 'port city', satisfying definitions are ironically still rare. Studies on the history of port cities have primarily focused on processes and developments after 1600 and global trade held centre stage; but there is much more to look at. Historians have credited port cities for being centres of far-reaching autonomy, ethnic diversity with astonishing organisational and singular logistical requirements, which hosted expert communities.¹¹³ Manila features Haneda Masashi's (羽田正) broad port city characteristics as 'important political centre', 'hub of regional economy', and place 'where new arts, ideas and technologies developed'.¹¹⁴ The oceans and sailing routes

110 O'Brien (2001), 'Introduction', p. 7.

111 Cf. Mahoney, 'Historical Comparative Analysis', p. 9, <http://www2.asanet.org/sectionchs/09conf/mahoney.pdf> (accessed 5 December 2012); Goldstone (1998), 'Initial Conditions', pp. 829-845.

112 Konvitz (1978), *Cities and the Sea*, p. 31. He speaks of the early seventeenth century as the 'age of new port city'. This trend corresponds with the original conceptualisation of new port cities in Northern Europe and the classic examples of Amsterdam and London.

113 Parker (2010), *Global Interactions*, p. 136. Between 2005 and 2006 the Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 歴史学研究会 published a trilogy on port cities called *Shirūzu minatomachi no sekaishi* ('Port Cities in World History Series') with research highlights in the field, including Murai (ed.) (2005), *Minato machi no sekaishi*; Fukasawa (2006), *Minato machi no topogurafi*; Haneda (ed.) (2006), *Minato machi ni ikiru*. Since 2013 the new series *Ajia kaiiki ni kogidasu* アジア海域に漕ぎだす (literally 'Rowing beyond Asian Seascapes' = Lectures on the East Asian Maritime World) edited by Kojima Tsuyoshi, has already produced five volumes. Contributions focus either on cultural, social, or political aspects of littoral cultures.

114 Haneda (2009), 'Introduction' to *Asian Port Cities*, pp. 3-4.

surrounding them were their strongest cultural, structural, and economic units, which is why port city communities' evolution usually diverges from national history narratives.¹¹⁵

The theoretical framework has been inspired not only by the cultural-linguistic and spatial turn in the social sciences but also by work on political consolidation, theories of state formation, empire building, and studies using post-modernist approaches on accommodation and appropriation. Employing these views to this project helped to replace conservative views maintaining that East Asian states were backwards, that the Spanish engaged in a rigid colonial enterprise in the East, and that the sixteenth-century Asian maritime world can be exhaustively explained with narratives of aggression and response. An actor-centred approach sensitive to the complex interactions within juxtaposed networks of interactions is of further interest for studying 'triangular' relations.¹¹⁶ Researchers using the network approach have stressed the specific nature of maritime merchants and the various types of collaborations and partnerships based on distinctive, non-hierarchical relationships.¹¹⁷

Before moving on to the first chapter, a few clarifying comments will be necessary. The spelling 'South East Asia' is used to indicate that the term both covers regions in East and Southeast Asia. The Philippines, for instance, is a unique example. Being considered periphery or 'rimlands',¹¹⁸ Luzon stands in clear contrast to the core regions defined by the powerful international forces of China, Japan, and Spain. The 'Philippines' themselves are a further problematic concept, being nothing else than a sixteenth-century

115 Inhabitants of port cities and those of the hinterland undeniably differed. The earlier are sometimes classified as commercial communities while the latter are considered administrative society members. Paul Cohen distinguishes for late imperial China a littoral zone oriented towards foreign trade, where cosmopolitan ideas flourished, and a vast interior ('hinterland') that was landlocked, agrarian, and Sino-centric. See Cohen (2003), *China Unbound*.

116 Trivellato (2002), 'Jews of Leghorn', pp. 59-89. Francesca Trivellato introduced an analytical use of network approach in her study of seagoing merchants. She advocates a micro-analytical approach to macro phenomena with the potential to narrow the gap between anthropological and economic historical understanding of merchant communities. Similar phenomena have been studied for trans- and cross-Pacific merchants. See Ardash Bonialian (2012), *Pacifico hispanoamericano*. He also concluded that Mexican merchants dominated the thriving commerce between Manila, Acapulco, and Callao, while Spain actively sought to limit commerce in the Pacific.

117 Ribeiro da Silva, Antunes (2011), 'Cross-cultural Entrepreneurship', pp. 49-76.

118 Victor Lieberman (2009), *Strange Parallels*, vol. 2, defines the rimlands as areas on the path to economic and political consolidation.

imperial Spanish construct. Strictly speaking there were no Philippines and no Filipinos before the arrival of the Spaniards.¹¹⁹

As for the concept of early modern or pre-modern states, Spain, China, and Japan represent advanced administrative and hegemonic entities with clear centralising foci, including elements of Weber's modern state.¹²⁰ In theory, violence was an indispensable means of political organisation. Other fitting attributes include territoriality, jurisdiction over population, sovereignty, legal personality, the ruling elite's monopoly on foreign relations, and a compelling ideology. While sensitivity to the blurring lines between empire and state at that time cannot be harmful, one should perceive the Spanish Overseas Empire as a multinational composite monarchy with a variety of territories in which it employed fiscal military reforms and coercive exploitation.¹²¹ Agrarian Ming China projected power beyond its vast territorial borders, while post-Warring States Japan actively built a pre-modern state.¹²²

Changes in South East Asia, which shifted parts of the Philippines into its proto-global age, include the arrival of the European trading nations, Japan's appearance on the global stage, and the Ming-Qing transition, which meaningfully coincided with the 'mid-seventeenth-century crisis in Southeast Asia'.¹²³ The focus on the period between the 1560s to the 1640s opens up for revisiting the conceptual construct of 'early modernity', which differs from region to region,¹²⁴ and has been criticised for its Eurocentric connotation.¹²⁵ Despite his critique of the concept, Jack Goldstone, for instance, admits the existence of an 'age of transition' that manifested in economic and socio-political dualism within centralised, bureaucratic monarchies.¹²⁶ Notions of 'early modernity' change, transformation, and increased mobility are not only all too obvious in encounters in Manila but

119 For scholars' ideas on the construction of this concept, see Legarda (2001), 'Cultural Landmarks', pp. 43-44. At present, the view that colonialism has created the Philippines is generally accepted, i.e. Francia (2010).

120 See Darwin (2007), *After Tamerlane*, p. 23.

121 Darwin (2007), *After Tamerlane*, p. 27.

122 Yamamoto (ed.) (2003), *Teikoku kenkyū*.

123 For the mid-seventeenth-century crisis, see Reid (1993), *Southeast Asia*, vol. 2, p. 26. See also Rothermund (2009), 'Krise des 17. Jahrhunderts', p. 57. The period interestingly covers the peak decades (1580-1630) of the small ice age.

124 Goldstone (1998), 'Problem', pp. 249-284.

125 Lieberman (1999), 'Transcending', p. 2. He argues that using the term 'early modern' for Asian history implies a 'degree of comparability to Europe'. He furthermore states the interrelatedness of the 'age of commerce' and 'early modern'.

126 Goldstone (1998), 'Problem', p. 253.

also reflect in the Spanish translation of 'early modernity' into '*edad moderna*' (1492/1500-1800). China and Japan started to apply this concept during the twentieth century. While Chinese historiography remained true to its own classical periodisation based on imperial dynasties, modern Japanese scholarship transposed date indications using traditional historical eras into the Western calendar and began applying Western historical periods.¹²⁷ Generally speaking, the pre-modern era in China is often said to begin with the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and in Japan usually with the establishment of Tokugawa rule in 1600.¹²⁸ Similar to such ambiguities, the concept of Spain poses further terminological challenges: I am aware of the debates about whether Spain is a proper term to use for the power that reigned over Manila in that period, given that all matters of expansionism and colonialism in the New World were subject to the Crown of Castile. Nevertheless the term 'España' or 'Hispania' is regularly found in contemporary sources. For the sake of simplicity, the terms 'Spanish', 'Castilian' or 'overseas Spanish' will therefore be used interchangeably in this work.

This book is divided into four parts containing an introduction and eight chapters. In part I, the general context presented in the introduction and chapter 1 provides the readership with the comparative framework and relevant factors of Spain, China, and Japan's connected history in Manila. In part II, chapter 2 sets the stage of this study by giving a general introduction into the political and economic development of early Spanish reign over the Philippines and Manila and chapter 3 evaluates the different levels of Manila trade, in order to contribute to a better understanding of the complex state relations in the early modern period. In part III, chapter 4 covers the extent to which shifts in governance and sovereignty changed self-conceptions in China and Japan as a consequence of increasing contact with 'foreigners' and how diplomacy and maritime trade came to play a critical role in East Asian quests for identity and polity building. Part III also includes specific case studies, presented in chapters 5 and 6, that evaluate the significance of bargaining between local and central levels for global representation. The two chapters show how global, central, and local factors co-existed and 'controlled' economic, political, and social developments.

127 Lieberman (1993), 'Local Integration', pp. 475-572, discusses periodisation and the structural changes that defined South East Asian space.

128 It is largely accepted that under the Tokugawa reign a stable political, social, and religious order was established, in particular compared to the preceding century. The time before 1570 and 1600 may therefore also be considered a critical juncture before the beginning of the early modern era. See Lewis (2009), 'Center and Periphery', p. 431.

In part IV, the two final chapters (7 and 8) examine how these connected histories influenced local history in Manila by pursuing what daily life in Manila looked like. Here, an actor-based approach contributes to a global social history for the sake of demystifying early modern 'globality'. Turning global, if understood as responding to the unfamiliar, making efforts to integrate and to find peaceful solutions in a multiethnic setting, was mostly the result of bargaining on the spot.

A note on names and places

This research project raises some awkward issues concerning the transcription of names and places. In general, names of people are given in the order of their own cultural practice. European names are given in the order first name followed by family name. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean names are given in the common order of family name followed by first name. Place names are given in their English form, i.e. Luzon instead of Luzón and Tokyo instead of Tōkyō. Chinese or Japanese characters are indicated to avoid confusion with similar phonetic terms. Other foreign terms are transliterated using spelling as close as possible to the original, while in cases of doubt attention is drawn to the original characters.